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There is now widespread consensus among scholars and policy makers that institutions are a crucial 
determinant of economic performance, and that the mechanisms involved in the processes of 
institutional emergence and change can generate solutions to socio-economics problems that 
enhance economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005; North, 2005). Both the conceptual frameworks 
focusing on the study of institutions and the large body of existing empirical literature on the topic 
show that a country’s long-term economic performance critically depends not just on its 
institutional environment but also on complementarities between different kinds of institutions 
(Gagliardi, 2015). 
Historical evidence also suggests that the causality from economic development to institutions 
may be even stronger than the one running from institutions to economic development. Economic 
development changes institutions through a number of channels. While increased wealth due to 
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growth may create greater demands for higher-quality institutions, and may make better institutions 
more affordable, economic development creates also new agents of change, demanding new 
institutions (Chang, 2011). 
From a theoretical point of view, two broad approaches have been proposed in economics to 
study institutional issues. The first, pioneered by Douglass North (1990) and other new institutional 
economists, and referred to here as the “historical approach”, conceptualizes institutions as the 
rules of the game, and integrates economic theory and economic history. The emphasis placed on 
the historical context comes from the observation that much of the developmental trajectory of 
societies is conditioned by their past in a path dependent way, with the implication that institutions 
are historically specific. It follows that historical contexts must always be taken into account, 
especially when dealing with the issue of institutional change (Alston, 1996).  
The historical approach furthermore combines a theory of human behavior with a theory of 
transaction costs. Its central result is that institutions determine the structure for exchange that 
influences the level of transaction costs, thereby affecting the feasibility and profitability of 
engaging in economic activity. It is through this mechanism that institutions are the underlying 
determinant of long-run economic performance. In other words, by defining and constraining the 
opportunity sets available to economic agents, institutions structure incentives in human exchange, 
provide a stable structure to human interaction, and reduce uncertainty by fostering convergent 
expectations (Gagliardi, 2008). 
The second analytical framework is the “comparative institutional analysis approach” 
associated with Masahiko Aoki (1996) that also draws on historical information while at the same 
time making extensive use of game theory. Institutions are here conceptualized as the endogenously 
emerging equilibrium outcome of a game and the focus is on the interdependencies existing across 
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economic, political, social and organizational domains. In addition attention is given to 
interdependencies arising across institutions linking different domains. 
The core issue is how the rules of the game are generated and become self-enforcing through 
the strategic interaction of the agents, whose behavior is influenced by the self-enforcing 
constraints determined within the existing set of rules (Aoki, 2001). The study of institutions 
through equilibrium analysis provides the basis for examining questions related to the emergence 
and change of institutions as reflecting the interrelations among society’s decision-makers, their 
past institutions and the evolving environment in which they interact (Greif, 1998). 
Despite the significant advances made by institutional analysis using both the above 
perspectives, we are still a long way from a satisfying theory of institutions and their economic 
effects. This symposium, dedicated to the memory of the late Masahiko Aoki, whose contributions 
to institutional analysis cannot be understated, aims to shed light on some of the issues involved in 
attempts to further this research agenda. The three papers included in the symposium were 
presented at a September 2013 workshop on “Institutions and Economic Change”, organized by 
the Group for Research in Organizational Evolution of the University of Hertfordshire Business 
School in England. 
The first paper, by Masahiko Aoki, proposes a conceptual and analytical framework for 
institutional analysis that aims to reconcile differences in the main approaches to institutions by 
showing that they are mutually supplementary. Aoki argues that on its own the game-theoretic 
approach to institutions (i.e. the comparative institutional analysis framework) is incomplete as a 
theoretical tool for institutional studies. Given that the comparison of various institutional 
arrangements and the exploration of institutional change involve multiple equilibria, the role of 
societal devices in aligning the strategic choices of agents also needs to be considered. Put 
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differently, Aoki argues, strategic and linguistic presentational considerations are mutually 
complementary for institutional studies.  
Aoki applies this combined framework to conduct a historical comparative institutional 
analysis of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan, revealing similar institutional complementarities. 
The productivity of the peasant-based economy provided the basis for the fiscal capability of the 
Qing rule, while the political stability of the military and administrative apparatuses of the Qing 
rule provided a relatively secure environment for the peasant-based economy. Likewise, the village 
undertaking system established by the Tokugawa and Han governments made the peasants owners 
of their cultivated lands, which provided collective incentives for farmers to make productivity 
gains and, at the same time, enlarged the fiscal capability of the governments. Aoki argues that 
these two stable patterns of strategic play were publicly represented by, respectively, the 
deontological values of Confucian principles and the polysemic notion of kō-ghi. The paper then 
shows that, facilitated by specific salient public propositions, agents’ strategic play led to the 
demise of these stable patterns with the Xinhai Revolution and the Meiji Restoration respectively. 
The second paper is by Richard Langlois and sheds light on the uses of institutional economics 
in economic history. It does so by examining the historiography of two major puzzles in European 
economic history: the scattering of plots in the open fields in the Middle Ages, and the transition 
to the factory system in the Industrial Revolution. The analysis falls within what Langlois calls the 
“good old” new institutional economics, i.e. the methodological approach previously referred to as 
the “historical approach”. The core argument is that both puzzles must be examined in light of the 
role they played in the larger institutional system. In both cases the very success of institutions in 
solving the economic problem with which they were confronted eventually created a new economic 
problem to which the original institutions were no longer adapted, leading to their replacement 
with new institutions. 
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 A feature of the open-field system, namely the scattering of plots held by villagers, has given 
rise to multiple interpretations in the literature. In Langlois’ view, the open-field system was a set 
of rules à la Ostrom to manage a complex semicommons, and scattering operated as a protection 
of the entire set of adapted rules. It did so by providing flexibility and diversification against a 
variety of contingencies, many of which were essential elements of the collective management 
system of the open fields. The institutional change from the open field-system to enclosures 
produced significant rural unemployment, and this led capitalists to put out spinning and weaving 
to the countryside. Langlois contends that when the expansion of the market for British textiles 
drove the putting-out system beyond the point of diminishing marginal returns, technological and 
institutional change occurred, leading to the development of mechanization and the factory system.  
In the final paper, Simon Deakin, David Gindis, Geoffrey Hodgson, Kainan Huang and 
Katharina Pistor claim that institutional analysis needs to take into account legal rules and the 
constitutive role of law, and that this is not only essential for scholars but also for the formulation 
of sound policies and regulations. The proposed approach of “legal institutionalism” focuses on 
the idea that law is a constitutive part of the institutionalized power structure, and a major means 
through which power is exercised. Law, from this perspective, is primarily constituted by the public 
ordering of the state, while customary law dominates only in the parts of the economy beyond the 
state’s reach. At the same time, spontaneous order explanations of law are found wanting, 
particularly in any developed economy of a certain size and complexity.  
Besides making these general points concerning the role of law, the paper argues that the 
removal of legal considerations from the economic concepts of property rights, exchange, contract 
and the firm has impaired the understanding of their nature and function in modern capitalism. For 
instance, legal institutionalism clarifies that the essence of the right of ownership of a resource is 
its acknowledgement of that right by others through mechanisms of legal accreditation and 
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legitimation. Similar claims are made about the key notions of exchange and contact. Importantly, 
the paper also demonstrates that the recognition of the firm as a legal entity contributes to solve 
some of the enduring problems in the theory of the firm literature.  
It is not suggested here that the above three papers fill completely the current lacunae in 
institutional analysis as discussed in earlier parts of this essay. However, the diversity of 
approaches that the three papers exhibit can enlarge the possibility of further conceptual innovation, 
while the significant overlaps in terms of core theory provide scope for the research program to 
make headway.  
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